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Abstract Procedures and the Physical World 
Paul Schweizer
1
 and Piotr Jablonski
1
Abstract.   The paper examines some central issues concerning 
the notion of implementing abstract formal structures, including 
effective procedures and dynamical systems, in the realm of 
physical space-time. We address the view originally put forward 
by Putnam and Searle, that virtually any physical system can be 
interpreted as implementing virtually any computational 
formalism, and defend the general conclusion that realizing an 
abstract procedural structure is not an intrinsic property of 
physical systems, but rather is a purely observer-dependent 
ascription. In a parallel manner, the 'trivialization' arguments 
originally put forward against computationalism are extended to 
dynamical systems theory, an alternative abstract framework that 
has also been advocated as providing the theoretical foundation 
for mentality in the natural world. Rather than attempting to 
distinguish 'true' from 'false' cases of implementation, we 
distinguish pragmatically useful ascriptions from those that serve 
no epistemic purpose.        1the  
1     ENGINEERED IMPLEMENTATION 
From a disembodied mathematical perspective, classical 
computation comprises an extremely well defined and stable 
phenomenon. Central to the theory of traditional computation is 
the intuitive notion of an effective or ‘mechanical’ procedure, 
and there are any number of different possible frameworks for 
filling in the details and making the idea rigorous and precise. 
Turing’s ‘automatic computing machines’ [1] (TMs), supply a 
very intuitive and elegant rendition of the notion of an effective 
procedure, but there is a well known variety of alternative 
frameworks.  
According to the widely accepted Church-Turing 
thesis, the class of computable functions is nonetheless captured 
in a mathematically absolute sense by the notion of TM 
computability, and every alternative formalization so far given of 
the broad intuitive notion of an effective procedure has been 
demonstrated to be equivalently powerful, and hence to specify 
exactly the same class of functions [2]. Thus the idealized notion 
of in-principle computability, where all finite bounds on input 
size, storage capacity and length of running time are abstracted 
away, seems to constitute a fundamental category, a stable and 
fundamental ‘mathematical kind’. 
A related further question is whether any sort of 
comparable feature carries over to computation as implemented 
or realized in the physical universe. Turing machines and other 
types of computational formalisms are mathematical 
abstractions and don’t exist in real time or space. In order to 
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perform actual computations, an abstract Turing machine must 
be realized by a suitable arrangement of matter and energy, and 
as Turing observed long ago [3], there is no privileged or unique 
way to do this. Like other abstract structures, Turing machines 
are multiply realizable - what unites different types of physical 
implementation of the same abstract TM is nothing that they 
have in common as physical systems, but rather a structural 
isomorphism expressed in terms of a higher level of description. 
Hence it’s possible to implement the very same computational 
formalism using modern electronic circuitry, a human being 
executing the instructions by hand with paper and pencil, a 
Victorian system of gears and levers, as well as more atypical 
arrangements of matter and energy including beer cans serving 
as tokens of the symbol ‘1’ and rolls of toilet paper serving as 
the tape. 
Adopting the conventions introduced by Schweizer 
[4], let us call this ‘downward’ multiple realizability, wherein, 
for any given abstract structure or formal procedure, this same 
abstract structure can be implemented via an arbitrarily large 
number of distinct physical systems. And let us denote this type 
of downward multiple realizability as ‘↓MR’. After the essential 
foundations of the mathematical theory of computation were 
laid, the vital issue then became one of engineering – how best to 
utilize state of the art technology to construct rapid and powerful 
physical implementations of our abstract mathematical 
blueprints, and hence perform actual high speed computations 
automatically. This is a clear and deliberate ↓MR endeavour, 
involving the intentional construction of artefacts, painstakingly 
designed to follow the algorithms that we have created. From 
this top-down perspective, there is an obvious and pragmatically 
indispensible sense in which the hardware that we have designed 
and built can be said to perform genuine computations in 
physical space-time.    
2     NATURAL COMPUTATION?   
In addition to these comparatively recent engineering 
achievements, but presumably still members of a single 
underlying category of phenomena, various authors and 
disciplines propound the notion of ‘Natural Computation’ (NC), 
and invoke a host of indigenous processes and occurrences as 
cases in point, including neural computation, DNA computing, 
biological evolution, molecular and membrane computing, slime 
mould growth, cellular automata, ant swarm optimization, etc. 
According to such views, computation in the physical world is 
not merely artificial – it is not restricted to the devices 
specifically designed and constructed by human beings. Instead, 
computation is a seemingly ubiquitous feature of the natural 
order, and the artefacts that we have produced constitute only a 
very small subset of the overall class of computational systems 
that inhabit the physical universe. 
The disciplinary and terminological practices 
surrounding NC plainly invite a more thorough and rigorous 
examination of the underlying assumptions involved. Salient 
questions in need of scrutiny include: To what extent, if any, is 
computation a genuine natural kind – is there an intrinsic unity 
or core of traits systematically held in common by the myriad of 
purported examples of computation in the physical world? In 
what sense, if any, can computation be said to take place 
spontaneously, as a truly native, ‘bottom-up’ phenomenon?  
The issue has pronounced conceptual importance with 
respect to positions on the conjectured computational nature of 
mentality and cognition. According to the widely embraced 
computational theory of mind (CTM), which underpins cognitive 
science, Strong AI and various allied positions in the philosophy 
of mind, computation (of one sort or another) is held to provide 
the scientific key to explaining and, in principle, reproducing 
mentality artificially. The paradigm maintains that cognitive 
processes are essentially computational processes, and hence that 
intelligence in the physical world arises when a material system 
implements the appropriate kind of computational formalism. So 
it’s an immediate corollary of CTM that the human brain counts 
as an exemplary instance of natural computation. 
Hence it is crucial to CTM's theoretical stance that 
there be a rigorous and precise analysis of physically grounded 
computation in the case of organically engendered human brains. 
But the issue has wider and independent significance, in an 
attempt to gain conceptual clarity on whether and to what extent 
computation can be cogently viewed as a natural occurrence. 
And this in turn requires a general theoretical investigation and 
articulation of what it means for computations and other sorts of 
abstractly specified formalisms and structures to be implemented 
in the physical realm. It is this last, overarching theme that will 
comprise the primary focal point of the ensuing discussion. 
 
3    THREE DIFFERENT SENSES 
 
For the sake of analytical precision, we will begin by 
disambiguating three possible senses in which real physical 
systems might be thought of as ‘performing a computation’, and 
where these distinct senses are often blurred or run together by 
proponents of NC.  
First (1), a physical system or object may be said to 
obey or satisfy a particular equation or mathematical function. 
For example, a falling body in the earth's gravitational field will 
satisfy or obey Newton's equation for gravitational acceleration. 
Similarly, the planets orbiting the sun satisfy or obey Kepler's 
laws of planetary motion. This has lead various NC enthusiasts 
to claim that the planets orbiting the sun, falling bodies in the 
earth's gravitational field, etc., are in fact computing the values 
of the equations in question. Taken to its most extreme form, this 
becomes the assertion that physical processes and natural laws 
are themselves fundamentally computational, and hence that 
computation constitutes the foundational key to the natural order.   
Second (2), the activities of a physical system or 
process may be precisely modelled or simulated by a given 
computational formalism or depiction. For example, it is 
possible to create highly accurate and explanatorily useful 
computer models which simulate the behaviour of various 
complex physical events such as earthquakes, climate change, 
hurricanes, particle collisions, protein folding, brain processes, 
etc. Again, the usefulness and accuracy of these computational 
models has lead proponents of NC to claim that the physical 
phenomena themselves are performing such computations or are 
somehow instances of such computations occurring in nature. 
And third (3), a physical device or process may be said 
to literally implement, realize or execute a particular algorithm 
or effective procedure. Thus when I write a piece of code in 
some artificial programming language, say Prolog, and then run 
this code on my desktop computer, there is a very clear and 
paradigmatic sense in which the electro-mechanical hardware in 
question is performing or executing the algorithm explicitly 
encoded in Prolog. 
It seems uncontroversial that (3) is the basic and 
indeed canonical sense of computation in the physical world, and 
constitutes the modern historical origin of the concept. But in the 
Prolog example used to illustrate the import of (3), the 
computation in question is not a natural occurrence ─ rather it’s 
a direct result of human design and engineering. Human artefacts 
in the form of electromechanical hardware devices comprise the 
arrangements of matter and energy that carry out the actual 
computation in space and time, and the procedures being 
executed are specified in terms of artificial programming and 
machine languages. In such literal and exemplary cases, real 
world computation is a purely synthetic phenomenon.  
However, this does not in itself rule out the possibility 
that there could be genuine natural computation in the stringent 
sense of (3), since it is still entirely possible that some 
appropriate version of CTM is true. For example, if Fodor [5] is 
correct, then the human brain, an organically engendered 
'wetware' device, is running the Language of Thought (LOT) as 
an indigenous formal system of rule governed symbol 
manipulation, in a manner directly comparable with a 
computational artefact. Thus if Fodor is correct, then the human 
brain is a paradigmatic instance of NC in sense (3). 
Accordingly, in the ensuing discussion we will treat 
Fodor's conjectured LOT as epitomizing what genuine 
computational processing in the natural world would look like in 
its most explicit form − a spontaneously generated, bottom-up 
case of formal symbol manipulation. And this is compatible with 
the foregoing discussion of downward multiple realization, since 
the relation between LOT and the brain could then be viewed in 
typical ↓MR terms. For example, an alternative mechanical 
device, physically quite unlike the brain, could presumably be 
constructed to implement the LOT in an artificial medium. 
In order to construct such an implementation, we 
would need to utilize expertise in engineering and materials 
science, which exploited the lawlike regularities that characterize 
the time evolution of physical systems. This expertise would be 
required to design the material implementation in such a way 
that it could be methodically interpreted, at the appropriate level 
of description, as behaving in a manner isomorphic to the 
abstract processing structure of the human brain. Indeed, it's 
perfectly conceivable that if we could abstract out the relevant 
computational structure of the LOT physically realized in brain 
activity, then we could run this same abstract computational 
structure on some version of our existing artificial hardware. 
And then, in perfect accord with ↓MR, the systematic and 
predictable behaviour of both the brain and the artificial device, 
seen as systems governed by natural law, could be interpreted, at 
a higher level of description, as implementations of the same 
abstract computational structure.  
4    CRITIQUE OF SENSES (1) AND (2) 
 
As noted in sense (1) above, a physical system or object, such as 
a piece of electromechanical hardware, may be described as 
obeying or satisfying various equations or mathematical 
functions. And it is by utilizing our knowledge of these 
regularities that we are able to construct physical realizations of 
abstract computational procedures, and thereby systematically 
and reliably preserve the implementational mapping from 
abstract formalism to relevant sequences of states of the physical 
machine.  What then is to be gained by then claiming that, in 
addition to performing a computation in virtue of systematically 
preserving this mapping, the hardware is performing yet another, 
underlying computation, simply in virtue of evolving through 
time in accordance with natural laws? 
 Such a claim seems to be founded on a conflation 
between two of Marr's [6] classic distinctions in levels of 
analysis. The salient difference between what is going on in (1) 
as opposed to (3) is precisely the difference between the level of 
bare mathematical function and the level of computational 
algorithm. For any given function there are many different 
algorithms for computing its input/output values, and a 
mathematical function or general equation on its own does not 
specify any corresponding formal method or single out any one 
of the many different possible corresponding effective 
procedures as privileged. Hence merely satisfying an equation, 
as in the case of a hardware device obeying a lawlike physical 
regularity, is too weak to underwrite an assertion of distinctively 
computational processing, because it leaves the vital procedural 
details completely unspecified. Exactly which particular 
algorithm for computing the values of Kepler's laws of planetary 
motion is the earth currently implementing? And articulated in 
precisely which abstract computational framework? 
 Thus sense (1) seems to constitute an unmotivated and 
theoretically unilluminating inversion of perspective. Human 
scientists have devised mathematical abstractions in the form of 
general equations in order to characterize observed regularities 
in physical behaviour. In turn, we utilize these rigorously 
characterized regularities to construct artefacts that can be 
systematically interpreted, at a higher level of description, as 
implementations of selected computational formalisms. In this 
respect, we have a well defined implementational foundation in 
brute physical behaviour. The ontological and causal status of 
real-time computations is thus grounded in a stable, non-
computational medium. But to then assert that the 
implementational medium itself, simply in virtue of evolving in 
accord with certain abstractly characterized patterns, is thereby 
performing lower level computations, seems to threaten a 
causal/ontological regress. And unless the particular algorithms 
and formalisms purportedly being executed are explicitly 
specified and substantiated, the assertion seems to make no 
additional contribution. However, the general equations as such 
are central to our scientific theorizing and abstract representation 
of the natural world.  In section 7 below we shall further 
investigate sense (1) and the status of such formal specifications 
in the particular guise of dynamical systems. 
 In the case of sense (2), the algorithmic details missing 
from sense (1) are provided, but they are located in the wrong 
place. When complex physical events and processes are 
accurately simulated via computational models, it is the artificial 
computational structures which compute the values of the laws, 
equations and regularities governing the physical phenomena 
being simulated. And indeed, this is why the models are accurate 
and useful. But what motivates the further claim that the 
complex physical phenomena are themselves somehow 
implementations of the computations performed by the artificial 
models?  Again, the same equations and regularities could be 
computed by another computational model using different 
underlying algorithms, programming languages, etc. to calculate 
the relevant values.  Which of the many distinct computational 
possibilities is privileged or singled out by nature? In agreement 
with Piccinini [7], we would advocate a sharp distinction 
between mere computational modelling and genuine 
computational processing in nature.  
 So in the ensuing discussion we will treat (3) as the 
literal and canonical sense of computation in the space-time 
arena. We diagnose sense (1) as derived from the mathematical 
characterization of fundamental regularities in nature, but where 
the additional attribution of computational activity is due to a 
conflation between Marr's distinct levels of bare mathematical 
function versus specific algorithm for computing the values of 
the function. Finally, sense (2) is a case of artificial simulation of 
natural events and processes, where the values of the regularities 
salient to sense (1) are explicitly computed, but where this 
computation is merely a tool of human heuristics and is not 
supported by nature. In this respect sense (2) is a hybrid of the 
more basic content involved in (1) and (3), and will not receive 
any further investigation. The ensuing discussion will focus 
primarily on (3) as the paradigmatic sense of computation in the 
physical world, and will also provide an allied investigation of 
sense (1), since both (1) and (3) are cases of applying explicit 
renditions of abstract, formal procedures directly to physical 
events and processes.  
 Of course, to some extent the issue could be seen as 
purely terminological. One could choose to brand computation in 
sense (3) as 'classical' or 'Turing' computation, and then label 
senses (1) and (2) as 'computation', but of a different, broader 
sort. But for this broadening of the scope of application of the 
term to count as useful and well motivated, it would need an 
accompanying story to explain (i) what essential characteristics 
are had in common to unify all three apparently quite disparate 
senses of the term, and then (ii) why the category of phenomena 
so unified should be called 'computation' and not something else. 
 We don't wish to dwell on mere terminological or 
taxonomical disputes, and hence maintain that, whatever use of 
terminology one may adopt, sense (3) has clear and paradigmatic 
import, and it is this interpretation of the word that we wish to 
emphasize and investigate. Furthermore, whatever may be going 
on in most cases of (1) and (2), be it felicitously categorized as 
'natural computation' or as something else, it is still quite distinct 
from what is captured by sense (3).  
 
5    COMPUTATION IS NON-INTRINSIC 
 
We will now articulate and begin to defend one of the main 
theses of the paper, a thesis stemming from arguments originally 
put forward by Putnam [8] and Searle [9, 10], that even in the 
quite restricted and canonical sense of (3), computation is not an 
inherent or intrinsic characteristic of any physical system. 
Instead, it's a purely observer dependent ascription, projected 
onto a physical system via an act of human interpretation.  
Furthermore, the extent to which a physical device can be 
interpreted as realizing any sufficiently rich computational 
formalism, such as an abstract Turing machine, is not absolute, 
but instead is always a matter of degree of approximation. And 
the choice to interpret a physical device as implementing a 
particular abstract formalism is always relative to our particular 
purposes and potential epistemic gains.  
Our normal practice of interpreting specialized 
artefacts as performing computations is clearly of very high 
pragmatic value. Nonetheless, such interpretations are ultimately 
dependent on human conventions and are not intrinsic to the 
hardware itself. Thus computation in the physical world is not 
sustained or underwritten by the innate structure of the systems 
interpreted as realizers, and computation as such is not a natural 
kind. We will begin our defence of this view by examining some 
well known arguments concerning the theoretical possibility of 
multifarious ‘deviant’ interpretations.         
 
6     TRIVIALIZATION ARGUMENTS 
Various critics of CTM have put forward a family of 
'trivialization arguments', directly relevant to sense (3) above. 
The arguments are based on the contention that the notion of a 
physical system implementing a computational formalism is 
overly liberal to the point of vacuity. As a case in point, Putnam 
[8] offers a proof of the thesis that every open physical system 
can be interpreted as the realization of every finite state 
automaton. Putnam's argument will be explored in more detail in 
section 7, in the context of Dynamical Systems theory.  
 In the current section of the paper we will consider the 
closely related position advanced by Searle [9], who argues that 
virtually any physical system can be interpreted as following 
virtually any program. Thus hurricanes, our digestive system, the 
motion of the planets, even an apparently inert lecture stand, all 
possess a level of description at which they instantiate any 
number of different abstract formal procedures. The stomach has 
inputs, internal processing states and outputs, and if one wanted 
to, one could interpret the inputs and outputs as code for any 
number of different symbolic processes. And in [10] Searle 
attempts to illustrate the extreme conceptual looseness of the 
notion of implementing an abstract formalism by famously 
claiming that the molecules in his wall could be interpreted as 
running the WordStar program. 
 Again adopting conventions introduced by Schweizer 
[4], let us label multiple realizability in this direction, wherein 
any given physical system can be interpreted as implementing an 
arbitrarily large number of different computational formalisms 
‘upward MR’ and denote it as ‘↑MR’. The basic import of ↑MR 
is the non-uniqueness of computational ascriptions to particular 
physical systems. In the extreme versions suggested by Putnam, 
Searle, and more recently Bishop [11], there are apparently no 
significant constraints whatever – it is possible in principle to 
interpret every open physical system as realizing every 
computational procedure. Let us call this extreme version 
‘universal upward MR’ and denote it as ‘↑MR*’. Mere ↑MR is 
weaker than ↑MR*, since the former does not assert that there 
are no salient constraints, and hence ↑MR would be consistent 
with the denial that, e.g., the molecules in Searle’s wall can in 
fact be interpreted as implementing the WordStar program, 
although every physical system is still interpretable as 
implementing some very large set of distinct computations. 
 In the present discussion we will not argue for or 
against ↑MR* but instead confine our considerations to the more 
modest ↑MR. In view of ↑MR, it’s still never the case that any 
given computational interpretation of a physical system is 
privileged or unique, and this is far more difficult to deny than 
the powerful and broad sweeping ↑MR*. In turn, the non-
intrinsic status of computation would seem to follow as a direct 
consequence of mere ↑MR alone. As long as there are at least 
two distinct interpretations, there is no objective fact of the 
matter regarding which computation is ‘actually’ being 
performed, nor which of the alternatives is the ‘correct’ or ‘real’ 
account. And this is because the computation itself is not an 
intrinsic property of the physical device, and is instead 
dependent on a human observer to supply the various alternative 
interpretations. 
 This is not to say that it’s purely a matter of caprice, 
and that there are no objective constraints that the interpretation 
must satisfy. Instead, the situation is perhaps comparable to the 
distinction between natural kinds, such as water, and 
conventional kinds, such as being a table. Even though 
membership in either kind might be based on criteria whose 
satisfaction (or not) is a matter of objective truth, still the criteria 
for conventional kinds are not intrinsic, and there is nothing 
about the particular arrangement of matter now holding up my 
desk top computer which makes it intrinsically a table. The 
salient criteria stem purely from human practices and 
stipulations rather than from, e.g., fundamental microstructure or 
natural law. 
 The original trivialization arguments are intended to 
undermine CTM, by showing that attributions of computational 
processing are overly liberal to the point of vacuity, and hence 
cannot serve as a criterion for mentality in the natural world. But 
the potential scope of application is clearly much wider, and they 
also serve to trivialize the idea of ‘Natural Computation’ in 
general. According to ↑MR*, anything computes everything, and 
hence computational processing in the natural world turns out to 
be far more rampant and ubiquitous than proponents of NC ever 
suspected. 
7     SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, PHYSICS 
At the abstract, formal level, computation is an essentially 
syntactic phenomenon, and how we choose to interpret 
arrangements of matter and energy as constituting, say, tokens of 
an abstract syntactic type, and thus specifying an implementation 
of the basic computational vocabulary, is entirely independent of 
physical composition. For example, in the downward ↓MR 
direction there is a more or less limitless diversity in the ways in 
which material patterns and arrangements can be viewed as 
implementing the binary notation of ‘0’ and ‘1’, from ink marks 
on a piece of paper, stones placed in wooden boxes, patterns on 
old-fashioned punch cards, electric voltages, beer cans 
positioned on rolls of toilet paper, … And this applies in the 
reverse ↑MR direction as well, wherein the same stones placed 
in wooden boxes can be interpreted as implementing any number 
of distinct computational formalisms.  
Classical computation is rule-governed syntax 
manipulation, and it is no more intrinsic to physical 
configurations than is syntax itself. It is also worth observing 
that discrete states are themselves idealizations, since the 
physical processes that we interpret as performing computations 
are in fact continuous, and we must abstract away from the 
continuity of the underlying substrate and impose a scheme of 
conventional demarcations to attain discrete values. Hence even 
this elemental building block of digital procedures must be 
projected on to the natural order from the beginning. The 
irresistible conclusion to be drawn is that there is a fundamental 
gap separating ‘concrete’ physical reality from the human-based 
ascriptions of abstract syntactic features. 
 In turn, there is yet another fundamental gap 
separating abstract syntactic features from their semantic 
interpretation. Just as syntax is not intrinsic to physics, so too 
semantics is not intrinsic to syntax. Just as being an instance of 
the spoken English sentence ‘The cat is on the mat’ is not an 
inherent property of the sound waves constituting any particular 
utterance token, so too, the associated proposition comprising 
the interpretation of the utterance is not intrinsic to the abstract 
syntactic structure. Instead, the associated meaning is determined 
via arbitrary human convention, and the same syntactic item 
could just as well have had the interpretation currently expressed 
in English by ‘The rat is on the table’ or ‘The dog is on the 
hearth’.  
In the context of classical computation, one of the key 
constraints in the notion of an effective procedure is that the 
rules can be followed 'mindlessly', i.e. without knowing what the 
manipulated symbols are supposed to mean.  As a consequence, 
there is no unique meaning determined by the procedure as such, 
and a multitude of distinct and incompatible interpretations are 
always possible. As a simple example, a Turing machine 
intended to compute the values of a particular truth function, say 
inclusive disjunction, can be easily reinterpreted as computing 
conjunction instead, simply by flipping our interpretation of the 
symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’, so that ‘0’ is construed as denoting true 
while ‘1’ denotes false. And the same procedure interpreted as 
computing conjunction could instead be construed as computing 
the values of the arithmetical function of multiplication. 
restricted to the numerical inputs 0 and 1.  
Similarly, formal systems in general are such that the 
transformations on symbols are not specified with reference to 
their intended interpretation. Many classical negative results in 
mathematical logic stem from this separability between formal 
syntax and meaning. The various upward and downward 
Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that formal systems cannot 
capture intended meaning with respect to infinite cardinalities. 
As another eminent example, Gödel’s incompleteness results 
involve taking a formal system designed to be ‘about’ the natural 
numbers, and systematically reinterpreting it in terms of its own 
syntax and proof structure. As a consequence of this 
‘unintended’ interpretation, Gödel is able to prove that 
arithmetical truth, an exemplary semantical notion, cannot, in 
principle, be captured by finitary proof-theoretic means. 
In summary, there are two fundamental gaps 
separating formal procedures, standardly interpreted as 
computing the values of given functions, from the physical 
processes that we construe as implementing such procedures. 
First there is the gulf dividing the intended semantic 
interpretation from the bare syntactic formalism, and second 
there is the chasm between abstract syntactic formalism and 
physical reality. In both cases the gaps can only be bridged by an 
act of purely conventional human interpretation. And it is in this 
sense that computation in the physical world is inherently 
observer dependent.    
 
8     PUTNAM AND DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS  
 
We will now take a closer look at the foregoing sense (1) 
sometimes used to support the view of computation in nature.  
As was noted in section 3, the term 'computation' is occasionally 
meant as a description of the fact that some physical processes 
satisfy or obey a mathematical equation. Although, as we noted, 
there is little reason to believe that planets orbiting the sun 
compute an algorithmic approximation of the Newtonian laws of 
motion. So instead of viewing  such cases in explicit NC terms, 
we will analyze the underlying notion of projecting the bare, 
abstract procedural descriptions furnished by dynamical systems 
onto the time evolution of physical phenomena. Thus, instead of 
a mapping between the physical states of the system and the 
computational states of an algorithm, there is a mapping between 
physical states and the variables of the appropriate dynamical 
system (DS). Following Jablonski [12], we argue that DS, when 
viewed in this manner, exhibit striking similarities to the 
inputless Finite-State-Automata (iFSA) analyzed by Putnam [8], 
and that the endeavour succumbs to very similar difficulties as 
originally proposed by Putnam in the context of strong ↑MR* 
arguments against computationalism. 
 Since an iFSA is defined by the set of monadic 
computational states and the rules of transitions from any given 
state to the next, any execution of an algorithm will take the 
form of the sequence of states. Putnam has noted that the 
evolution of any non-cyclic physical phenomena can be divided 
into a sequence of periods in such a way that we can map the 
physical states of the system onto the computational states of an 
iFSA. Say, we want to show that Searle's wall realises a 
computation performed by the iFSA defined by the states A, B 
and C and rules of transition A>B, B>C and C>B. If initialised 
in the state A the automaton will transit through states ABCBCB 
and will continue to oscillate between states C and B. We can 
claim that the wall performed 6 steps of the computation within 
any period of time e.g. from 12:00 to 12:06. We simply label all 
physical states of the wall within the first minute as 
computational state A, within the second minute as state B, third 
– C, forth – B, fifth – C and sixth – B.  
Since the complexity of the thermal movements in the 
wall, openness of the system and, possibly, some non-reversible 
physical phenomena (e.g. radioactive decay) insure that every 
physical state of the wall will manifest itself only once, the 
labelling will be functional i.e. for every physical state only one 
computational state is given (however, a single computational 
state can be realised by many different physical states). 
In applying this same basic strategy using a Dynamical 
Systems framework rather than inputless Finite-State-Automata, 
we first note that a system is defined by the set of its variables 
and rules governing the evolution of the variables over time. 
Unlike iFSA that have a finite number of possible states, the 
states of a DS are given by the vector of real number variables. 
Thus DS have an infinite number of possible states. Usually, the 
dynamical models are defined as deterministic, continuous 
systems so the rules governing the dynamics are given by a set 
of differential equations. Equations are the continuous 
equivalents of the rules of transitions for the iFSA. Finally, the 
phase-space trajectory of the system, the evolution of its 
variables over time, can be compared to the sequence of 
computational states of the iFSA.  
The analogies between the two formalisms can be 




Finite number of states Infinite number of states 
Initial state Initial conditions 
Table of transitions Differential equations 
Computational steps Time 
Sequence of states Trajectory through the phase space 
 
Using these analogies, we can see that it is possible to 
map any finite trajectory of any DS onto any non-cyclic physical 
process in a manner similar to Putnam's original strategy. We 
map the first point of the trajectory onto the first physical state of 
the system and all consecutive points onto the corresponding 
physical states.  
First, we need to map a real, physical time of the 
process onto the abstract time of the DS. Since we are interested 
in the finite period, we may define a mapping function M as 
follows: 
 
where  is an abstract time of the DS,  – real, physical 
time,  – the beginning of the dynamical process,  – the end 
of the dynamical process,  and  – the beginning and the end 
of the physical process in real time.  
We need to include Putnam’s condition of non-cyclic 
behaviour of the physical system in order to guarantee, that 
every moment of the physical time  indicates just one physical 
state  of the system. Given that DS is defined by its equations 
of motion 
 
where  is a multidimensional vector of variables, and 
a single trajectory of the DS is determined by the initial 
conditions  and the time interval, we can take an integral of 
the equations of motion that will have the form of the function of 
the state of the DS over time . This integral defines the 
trajectory of the system in phase space and is the equivalent to 
the sequence of states in the case of iFSA. However, since the 
trajectory is composed of the infinite number of points it has to 
be expressed as a function of time and cannot be presented in a 
form of a table of values. Now we can form a labelling function f 
that assigns abstract states of the DS to the physical states  of 
the system. 
 
Thus for every physical state  we know the time t 
when it appeared (since the behaviour of the system is non-
cyclic). Knowing the time t and the time-mapping function M(t) 
we can determine the corresponding time  of the 
abstract dynamics. Eventually, since we know the states of the 
DS as a function h of time  we can determine the formal state  
of the DS, and what follows, the values of its variables. In other 
words, for every non-cyclic physical system and finite period of 
time we are able to map its states onto states of any DS.  
A main difference between DS and iFSA lies in the 
fact that the latter have a finite number of states and steps while 
the former have an infinite number. However, since physical 
systems are continuous in nature the mapping still can be carried 
out. In order to perform Putnam's version of trivialization we 
need to know in advance the sequence of the states of the iFSA. 
In the case of DS we ought to know the trajectory of the system. 
That was easy for iFSAs since computation of the sequence 
required only a finite number of steps. However for the DS we 
need to integrate the equations of the DS. In many cases, 
nonlinear differential equations do not have analytic solutions so 
we are unable to obtain the trajectory of the system in the form 
of a function of variables over time. 
This limitation is however, only epistemic in nature. 
Every DS has a trajectory defined for every initial condition even 
if we are unable to discover its analytic form. We still may 
conclude that, in principle, there is a mapping between any DS 
and physical system, although in many cases we will unable to 
provide the specific details. 
 
9      CONSTRAINTS ON IMPLEMENATION 
 
In response to ↑MR* and the trivialization arguments, various 
authors, including Chrisley [13], Chalmers [14], Copeland [15], 
and Block [16] have proposed a number of constraints on 
computational interpretations in an attempt to distinguish ‘true’ 
cases of implementation from the myriad of purportedly ‘false’ 
cases utilized by Putnam and others. Two of the most intuitively 
compelling restrictions are supplied by (i) causal and (ii) 
counterfactual considerations. The first constraint holds that the 
pattern of abstract state transitions constituting a particular run of 
the computational procedure on a particular input must map to 
an appropriate transition of physical states of the machine, where 
the relation between succeeding states in this physical sequence 
is governed by proper causal regularities. The second constraint 
holds that  a necessary condition for being a ‘genuine’ 
implementation is the ability of the mapping to support 
counterfactual sequences of transitions on inputs not actually 
given. This constraint is prompted by the fact that various ↑MR* 
mappings from formalism to physical system, given by Putnam 
and others, are defined only for a single run and say nothing 
about what would have happened if a different input had been 
given (see Bishop [11] for an exception). 
 Although both (i) and (ii) are intuitively plausible 
suggestions, we view both as ultimately unsuccessful in blocking 
the trivialization results. See Schweizer [4] for arguments to the 
effect that, within the context of computation in canonical sense 
(3), constraint (i) provides a sufficient but not a necessary 
condition, while (ii) is unsatisfiable in principle (for sufficiently 
rich frameworks, such as those invoked in the Church-Turing 
thesis), and can serve only as a measure of degree of 
approximation.  
 In the context of ‘computation’ in sense (1), and 
pertinent to the above extension of the ↑MR* arguments to 
Dynamical Systems, we will now briefly examine two of the 
main points raised by Chalmers [14] and address them in the 
context of DS trivialization. In line with (ii) above, it has been 
objected that Putnam's labelling does not map counterfactual 
computational states onto any physical states. If a given iFSA is 
defined by states A, B, C, D and transitions A>B, B>C, C>B and 
D>B it could also perform the sequences ABCBCB, BCBCBC, 
CBCBCB or DBCBCB. Because Putnam’s method of 
construction of the labelling function only works for the single 
chain of physical events, we would be unable to map state D 
onto any physical state of the wall because D did not appear in 
the sequence used for labelling. 
Since an iFSA can perform only a finite number of 
state sequences, we need to form a labelling function that maps 
all those possible sequences onto some states of the physical 
system and show that such a labelling can be constructed for an 
arbitrary physical device or phenomenon. In the context of 
classical computation, this stronger version of trivialization is 
known as  the “clock and dial” reply to Chalmers objection. The 
argument states that every physical system can contain not only 
non-reversible physical phenomenon (a clock) but also some 
physical magnitude that can be set into a number of distinct 
states and will remain in the same state for the given period of 
time (a dial). Thus the complete state of the system is defined by 
the pair [d, ts ], where d is the state of the dial and ts  – the state 
of the clock at time t. Since our iFSA can perform four different 
sequences, d will take four values. The state of the dial will 
determine which sequence is mapped onto the states of the clock. 
Thus if the dial is set to 
1d we will map the first sequence onto 
physical states of the system during this time period. If the dial is 
set to 
2d we will map the second sequence and so on. One can 
argue that not every physical system contains clock and dial 
components, however there is certainly a large class of such 
systems thus the ‘↑MR’ is conserved. 
A parallel strategy can be applied in the context of DS 
trivialization. The infinite number of possible trajectories of the 
DS forces us to modify the “clock and dial” response to the 
argument. The clock will have to transit continuously through an 
infinite number of physical states within a finite amount of time 
(which seems to be uncontroversial since physical time is 
continuous) while the dial will have to be substituted by devices 
that can be set in an infinite number of states. We may picture 
the devices as set of continuous sliders, one for every variable in 
the equations of the DS. Every initial state of the DS can be 
encoded by the appropriate setting of the sliders just as every 
initial state of the iFSA can be encoded as a position of the dial. 
After that, we map the integrated trajectory of the DS onto the 
run of the clock. 
A second requirement is reliability, which is closely 
akin to causal regularities − a proper labelling function should 
interpret not only one but every evolution of the physical system 
from the same initial state as a realisation of the same algorithm. 
If Searle is right, then he should be able to reliably and 
repeatedly reset his wall to a given initial condition and 
demonstrate that its physical evolution is identical to the one 
used for the initial labelling. Since the wall is an open system 
and (as required for the trivialisation argument) exhibits non-
cyclic evolution it certainly will not repeat its states. 
However, the “clock and dial” version of the argument 
seems to be immune to this objection. The dial can be reliably 
set into any of its states and the clock will reliably pass through 
the same sequence of moments. And it appears that there will be 
no significant difference in this regard between a continuous 
“clock an dial” and the sequential counterpart used for iFSA as 
long as we are able to demonstrate that the clock can reliably 
pass through its sequence of states and the sliders can stay in the 
unchanged position through the period of observation. 
 
10   COMPUTATION AND PRAGMATICS  
 
We would now like to propose a different perspective on the 
issue. Rather than distinguishing ‘true’ from ‘false’ cases of 
implementation, what these and other proposed  constraints do 
instead is to go some distance in distinguishing interesting, 
conceptually rich and pragmatically useful implementations 
from the many uninteresting, trivial and useless cases that 
abound in the space of possibility. It’s certainly true that there is 
no pragmatic value in most interpretive exercises compatible 
with ↑MR and ↑MR*. Ascribing computational activity to 
physical systems is useful to us only insofar as it supplies 
informative outputs, which in most cases will come down to new 
information acquired as a result of the implemented calculation.  
 So, interesting and useful observer dependent 
computation takes place when we can directly read-off 
something that follows from the implemented formalism, but 
which we didn’t already know in advance and explicitly 
incorporate into the mapping from the start. That’s the incredible 
value of our computational artefacts, and it’s the only practical 
motivation for playing the interpretation game in the first place.  
Hence a crucial difference between our computational artefacts 
and the attributions of formal structure to naturally occurring 
open systems, as employed by ↑MR* exercises, is that the 
mapping in the latter case is entirely ex post facto and thus 
supplies us with no epistemic gains. The abstract procedural 
‘trajectory’ is already known and used as the basis for 
interpreting various state transitions in the open system and 
hence characterizing it as an implementation. In sharp contrast, 
we can use the intended interpretation of our artefacts both to 
predict their future behavior, as well as discover previously 
unknown output values automatically.  
 And this is obviously why an engineered correlation 
obtains between fine-grained causal structure and abstract formal 
structure in the case of our artefacts – we want them to be 
informative and reliable! We also want them to be highly 
versatile, and this is where counterfactual considerations come to 
the fore in practice: over time we can do runs on a huge number 
of different inputs, and in principle the future outputs follow as 
direct consequences of the intended interpretation.  So a physical 
system is useful to us as a computer only when its salient states 
are distinguishable by us with our measuring devices, and when 
we can put the system into a selected initial state to compute the 
output of our chosen algorithm on a very wide range of specific 
input values. 
 These pragmatic considerations supply clear and well 
motivated criteria for differentiating useful from useless cases of 
physical implementation. And we would advocate this type of 
pragmatic taxonomy in lieu of attempts to give overarching 
theoretical constraints purporting to distinguish ‘true’ from 
‘false’ cases. Some basic desiderata for pragmatically valuable 
implementations include (a) fully automatic, (b) reliable, (c) 
versatile in the sense of computing values for a wide range of 
different inputs (d) non ex post facto (e) yielding increased 
predictive power with regard to future physical states of  the 
implementing mechanisms, (f) possessing technologically 
manipulable initial configurations and output configurations 
detectable by our measuring devices and (g) physical rather than 
purely abstract constraints on the input and output 
characterizations.   
 Similarly, ascriptions of computation in the sense (1) 
to the physical systems are motivated by pragmatic reasons. 
Useful interpretations ought to yield simple formalisms whose 
equations we are able to integrate or at least investigate their 
properties with our mathematical resources. Variables should be 
mapped onto reliably observable physical magnitudes that figure 
in many scientific theories and are not proposed ad hoc. 
Valuable interpretations of physical phenomena in terms of DS 
give us simplified formal description, epistemically useful and, 
hopefully, manifesting some predictive powers. We cannot 
however, claim that the physical process itself realises the 
mathematical equations in any other sense than that its behaviour 
can be fruitfully described using such equations. 
 
11     CONCLUSION 
 
Computation is an extrinsic, observer dependent interpretation 
that we project onto physical systems according to our purposes 
and potential epistemic gains. As such, it does not support a 
stable or independent natural kind. Diverse types of natural 
events and processes can be modelled or simulated using 
computational techniques, as in sense (2) above, but this is to be 
distinguished from canonical sense (3), in which the system itself 
is viewed as instantiating and executing an explicit formal 
procedure. However, various physical systems do spontaneously 
‘obey’ clear regularities in their evolution through time, and 
many such regularities have been mathematically characterized 
in terms of Dynamical Systems theory. Although this sense (1) 
reading does not comprise a case of genuine  computation, in the 
strict connotation of executing a well defined formal procedure,  
it does provide a fundamental form of mathematical 
representation of the natural world.  
 Various opponents of the Computational Theory of 
Mind have provided trivialization arguments to the effect that, 
even in canonical sense (3), the notion of implementing a 
computational formalism is overly liberal to the point of vacuity. 
Such results serve to undermine not only CTM in particular, but 
the more encompassing notion of ‘Natural Computation’ in 
general. In a parallel manner, we extend this strategy to sense (1) 
‘computation’ in the guise of  Dynamical Systems theory, to 
argue that realizing such abstract formal structures is again a 
matter of observer dependent ascription. As with the original 
trivialization strategies aimed against CTM, this extended result 
has deep implications for the science of mind, since Dynamical 
Systems have been advocated (by, e.g. van Gelder [17]) as 
providing an alternative theoretical foundation for mentality in 
the natural world. 
 Advocates of CTM have proposed a number of 
constraints on the notion of ‘genuine’ implementation, in an 
attempt to block the trivialization results and uphold a robust 
notion computation in the physical world. However we argue 
that such constraints derive purely from human interest as 
opposed to underlying and independent matters of fact. Rather 
than serving to distinguish true’ from ‘false’ cases of 
implementation, what the proposed  constraints do instead is to 
help distinguish conceptually rich and pragmatically useful 
implementations from the many uninteresting, trivial and useless 
cases that abound in the space of theoretical possibility.  
 Although practical considerations clearly guide the 
design and construction of our computational artefacts, such 
pragmatic motivations do not justify any deep or ontologically 
grounded distinction between genuine versus trivial 
interpretations. Hence we support an anti-realist view of 
computation in nature, and implementing or realizing abstract 
formal structures in general is not an intrinsic property of 
physical systems. In particular we have viewed the notion of 
implementation in the context of senses (1) and (3), but the view 
generalizes to all the prospective forms of non-Turing 
'computation' inspired by considering natural events and 
processes. These are abstract, observer dependent ascriptions 
projected onto a more basic physical substrate.   
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